HIGHLIGHT REPORT

2022 East Asia Strategy Forum (EASF)
THE INSTITUTE FOR PEACE & DIPLOMACY

is a non-profit and non-partisan North American international affairs think tank operating in the United States and Canada dedicated to promoting dialogue, diplomacy, prudent realism, and military restraint—principles we believe are the four cornerstones of sustainable peace in an increasingly complex and dynamic international system.

Founded in 2019, the Institute (IPD) encourages policymakers, and leaders in government, civil society, and business community to adopt a more restrained and open-minded approach in managing the strategic challenges and geopolitical risks of the 21st century.
THE ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION OF CANADA

is a not-for-profit organization focused on Canada’s relations with Asia. Our mission is to be Canada’s catalyst for engagement with Asia and Asia’s bridge to Canada.

Our research provides high-quality, relevant, and timely information, insights, and perspectives on Canada-Asia relations. Providing policy considerations and business intelligence for stakeholders across the Asia Pacific, our work includes Reports, Policy Briefs, Case Studies, Dispatches, Digital Media, and a regular Asia Watch newsletter that together support these thematic areas.

APF Canada also works with business, government, and academic stakeholders to provide custom research, data, briefings and Asia Competency training for Canadian organizations. Advisory services are available by request. We would be pleased to work with you to meet your research and business intelligence needs.
# Table of Contents

**Panel I**  
Regional Perspectives on East Asia’s Strategic Environment: Security Regimes, Challenges, & Actors ................................................................. 1

**Panel II**  
Alliances, Blocs, & Security Communities: Sources of Stability or Instability in East Asia? ........................................................................................................ 9

**Panel III**  
Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: National Interests & Regional Responses ........... 19

**Panel IV**  
Energy Security in East Asia: Oil & Gas Between Sanctions & Diversification .......... 27

**Panel V**  
Maritime Security & Maritime Law in East Asia ...................................................... 35

**Panel VI**  
Economic Regionalism: FTAs, Supply Chains, & Securitization .............................. 41

**Panel VII**  
Nuclear Security in East Asia .............................................................................. 49
About EASF 2022

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APF Canada) co-hosted the second annual East Asia Strategy Forum (EASF 2022) on November 1-2 in downtown Ottawa.

EASF 2022 was a multi-disciplinary conference that fostered the exchange of knowledge and actionable policy recommendations on geopolitical and geo-economic developments in East Asia, and Canada's foreign policy and defence approach to the region. It attracted a specialized in-person audience including academics, researchers, policymakers, defence and strategy experts, former military officials, current and former diplomats, and business leaders.

With support from the MINDS program at the Canadian Department of National Defence, this two-day conference was hosted in a hybrid format, convening in-person and virtual keynote speakers, deep-dive panels, and networking sessions. The program engaged around 41 expert speakers from Canada, the United States, and the Asia Pacific. Experts engaged in constructive discussions on East Asia’s strategic environment, alliances, energy security, maritime security and law, economic regionalism, proliferation, and cybersecurity.

EASF 2022 was a timely event as the Government of Canada shortly announced its Indo-Pacific Strategy to inform Canada’s engagement with the region in the coming years.

IPD and APF Canada would like to thank the sponsors of EASF 2022 including the MINDS program of the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, and Gowling WLG. The generous support of these sponsors made the organization of EASF 2022 possible.
PANEL I

Regional Perspectives on East Asia’s Strategic Environment: Security Regimes, Challenges, & Actors

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is its attempt to push back on being a rule-taker and to reassert ASEAN centrality given the Indo-Pacific paradigm has been widely adopted by external partners as a fait accompli.

- The combined military and economic weight of the U.S. and China attenuates the region’s multipolar potential, but both superpowers’ foreign policies still depend on the buy-in of middle powers who are able to mediate their competition.

- Southeast Asia does not uncritically believe the prevailing rules-based order has truly been fair to its interests and it may subsequently take advantage of great power competition to advocate for changes.

- Universal values in Asia are largely limited to state sovereignty, not political values — which poses risks to the resonance of a strategy founded on ideological competition that pits democracy against autocracy.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS

Michael Swaine
Director, East Asia Program, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
— United States

On the United States’ current strategy towards China and the Indo-Pacific today:
The current strategic framework contains no viable nor concrete strategy for engaging with China in a meaningful way. Other than shaping or deterring, there are no other specific objectives in mind. There are very few, if any, definitions of what middle grounds would like when dealing with China in a variety of different functional policy areas. There are just a lot of grand statements being made and a desire to avoid a Cold War or conflict. In sum, there's not much there that I would regard as a strategy that reflects the complexity of China's role in Asia and the uncertainties of other countries in the region.

The United States' perspective on Asia is good in recognizing the need for itself to improve its presence in the region. However, this must be done in a meaningful and realistic way. The United States must do so in congruence with its own resources and limitations as well as its strengths. This level of complexity and nuance is very much absent from U.S. Strategy today.

On how central Sino-American competition is to regional dynamics:

The United States and China have an enormous influence over the course of the region. They have by far the greatest amount of economic and military power and, as a result, a greater amount of influence than any of the other Asian powers. You could add up all of the Asian powers together in their economic size and military power and they wouldn't come close to the United States and China.

However, in order to conduct affairs in the region and towards one another, they need to depend upon the cooperation or acquiescence of other major Asian powers. This is especially true for the United States. If it wants to play a significant role in the Western Pacific - in the face of China's growing military capabilities there and particularly vis-a-vis Taiwan - the U.S. must rely upon Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines as well. The United States is also dependent upon Asian democracies to gain support for advancing democratic values in the region.

Ultimately, there is a good deal of interdependency that goes on in the region. Despite that the region is not genuinely multipolar in nature, Middle Powers in Asia do possess both actual and latent influence. With that said, middle powers in the region could do a lot more, stand up a lot more, and speak out a lot more in expressing their desires and concerns about the nature of the Sino-U.S. relationship and where it is going.
On bridging the gaps in the Indo-Pacific:

Not all values and norms are shared nor interpreted in the same way by the countries in the region. The question is do you let them get in the way of areas where you need to have a common sense of norms and values? If we emphasize the values here are political and that they have to do with democracy as defined by liberal democratic nations versus non-democracies as seen in autocratic nations and one-party dictatorships, we’re not going to get anywhere in terms of developing common norms for the region and never be able to bridge gaps. We’ve got to proceed on the basis of what norms we share and what are our interests in cooperating to strengthen those shared norms. There are ways to reach common ground but we’ve got to be able to suppress those different forces that push towards an extreme and totalistic definition of the norms and value competition in a very zero-sum way.

On what guides U.S.–China tensions over the Indo-Pacific security architecture:

The greatest problem in developing a coherent region-wide architecture is national interest and ideology. You have two great powers that are competing over the same space. Both of them regard that space as absolutely critical to their interests. And they want to have a preponderance of influence in defining that space and the way in which it’s going to function over time. The U.S. sees itself as the guarantor of order and security in the region and has played that role for many decades, particularly in maritime Asia, and it seems it’s threatened. Thus, it’s trying to strengthen the region’s awareness about its concern over China’s role in the region. The Chinese are not doing much differently. They see the region as one over which the U.S. has an inordinate amount of control and influence, so they are trying to alter the structure and nature of the region better to Chinese interests.

There is to some significant extent a kind of zero-sum rivalry in the region. But the outcome doesn’t have to be this way if the two sides recognize that they’re both contributing to it and that they both have to modify their positions to some significant degree to reach some kind of mutual accommodation in certain areas. What we have to do is to be able to define what regional order means for a contentious U.S.–China relationship in this complex and central region. This cannot be done simply from Sino-U.S. interaction. It would require the involvement of
other regional powers, especially middle powers, such as Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN nations. These countries should better coordinate their definition of what the region should look like and how the U.S.-China relationship should develop over time.

Kai Ostwald
Director, Institute of Asian Research & Associate Professor, School of Public Policy & Global Affairs, University of British Columbia
— Canada

On if Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy will be significantly noticed in the region:

Canada is 25 years past the apex of its engagement in Asia. There are thus important practical decisions to be made from a Canadian perspective including how to handle important trade-offs and how to divert resources to a region that has not been the central focus of foreign policy. There are challenges on the ground as well. Canada has an immense amount of capacity-building to do both domestically and in the region for it to become a significant player.

On strategic alignment with the United States and Canada’s role in the Indo-Pacific:

Canada is strongest internationally when it plays its own role and when it defines its own role. There is an appeal to being a proxy of sorts to the United States. The United States remains the world’s largest military power and being a satellite of the U.S. gives power by proximity. But doing so would also limit Canada’s ability to be an effective player in meaningful ways. I think Canada has learnt domestically how to engage a diverse and nuanced population. If it brings some of this particular experience to its diplomacy, Canada can play the role as a mediator or at least contribute to the role of mediating or moderating great power conflict.

On the limitations of Canada’s value-centric approach:

It’s important to point out that Asia today is a different place than it was 25-30
years ago. The West and the appeal of Western ideas is not what it once was. There’s a lot of awareness of the challenges that North America and Europe have faced socially, politically, and economically. In the meantime, there are alternative models in East Asia that some in Southeast Asia look towards and recognize as successful in things that are valued such as development and raising livelihoods.

Canada has a lot of work to do to reconcile principle-based foreign policy with reality on the ground. These two things are not incompatible. Where Canada has gotten itself into trouble with its values-based diplomacy is what is seen as a mismatch between very strong rhetoric and a very limited presence on the ground. For this type of diplomacy to be successful, Canada has to be more present in the region, committed to the region, and invest in the region in a meaningful way. Being a reliable partner is critical to Canada’s Indo-Pacific success.

On rethinking Canada’s regional engagement and cooperation with the U.S.:

It’s important for Canada to think about its place in the world independent of the United States. With a major shift in foreign policy, it’s important to have all contingencies on the table. It is the case that political instability in the United States is likely to continue and that will have foreign policy implications on a number of levels.

For Canada to play the mediating role for it to reclaim its place in the global order as a middle power that has the capacity to leverage goodwill and the relatively good perception of Canada, it has to have a degree of independence or at least be seen with a degree of independence from the U.S..

Elina Noor
Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada
— United States / Malaysia

On ASEAN’s distinct outlook in the Indo-Pacific and if ASEAN can be a rule-maker
ASEAN has been a really good rule-taker. Accordingly, the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific is really a reaction to the Indo-Pacific concept that the U.S. proposed. ASEAN is still grappling with how to conceive the Indo-Pacific as a strategic notion that will work for it. This remains the case due to the twin concepts of ASEAN centrality as well as ASEAN unity. Without ASEAN unity on a variety of issues - strategic or geopolitical - there cannot be ASEAN centrality.

The challenge for ASEAN is to put itself at the table and be more than just a part of the conversation. Instead, it should aim to participate and even help shape that conversation. Unfortunately, that leadership in ASEAN is missing right now and we continue to try to unpack what unity and centrality mean for us in the region without really having a forward vision of how we see ourselves in this larger chess game between major powers.

Economic frameworks have been a very convenient and practical tool for ASEAN to foster cooperation, collaboration, and integration amongst itself and its dialogue partners. The complication now is that economics has been weaponized. Economics is no longer just trade and commerce. And we’ve seen this with IPEF and its connections with other strategic initiatives that the U.S. has proposed. Now we have a series of dots that are going to be linked up together particularly to advance the notions of the world that certain countries feel should be prevalent and dominant in fact.

On choosing sides between the United States and China:

Southeast Asian countries are feeling increasingly squeezed. Even though major powers say we will not make you choose and we don’t want you to choose, the reality is that those choices are being forced upon us via competing initiatives in the realms of economics or defence and security.

On the rules-based order:

The assumption is that the rules-based order has worked for all countries in the world equally. But that’s not the case. Sure, countries have been pulled out of poverty and economic growth has happened. But the reality is that there still is a
lot of inequity and inequality in major power relations with the rest of the world. We like to talk about the Global South and the Global South is often seen at the margins of the major powers. But we have to recognize that the Global South is the majority of the world. If we turn that framing onto its head and really think about the power of the majority world means for our agency and our autonomy in a more competitive geopolitical landscape, then maybe we can start to fashion our own futures in very different ways from the framework and template we have right now.

On the lack of ASEAN voices and strategic foresight:

What is crucial for ASEAN is to preserve its diversity in all its different forms but also speak with one voice, particularly at regional and international forums. This is important as norms are being formed in many areas. There's going to be a new battle for governance frameworks and you see this with competing initiatives between the U.S. and China on the policy and technical levels. At the present, there hasn't been enough representation among Southeast Asians at these tech forums. There needs to be that foresight.

Very often ASEAN countries are caught up in the moment. We're trying to grapple with geopolitical competition and we are not thinking far enough about the order that is going to be imposed on us. We should be trying to help forge that system in a way that works for us.

On current regional developments:

We are driven too much by the geopolitical agenda. Instead, we should focus on developing economic cooperatives. Starting from the Trump administration, the
United States has been gearing the region to be more configured to geopolitics. They now focus more on NATO, Five Eyes, the QUAD, AUKUS, and IPEF which all are centred around a geopolitical agenda. China, on the other hand, has been pushing forward economic initiatives such as the RCEP, the largest FTA in the region. We should also promote the development of the CPTPP, one in which China is very interested in joining.

As we move forward, we should seek a more balanced and inclusive globalization. Specifically, we should incline ourselves to developing open economic frameworks instead of focusing on geopolitics. This is the right way to go as we are already facing high inflation and the prospects of a new round of recession. We cannot afford an energy crisis and we have to work together to save the global economy.

On the possibility of a direct clash between the United States and China in the short-term:

Whether we have a direct conflict in the next five to ten years will largely depend on the wisdom and the sober-mindedness of the leaders of these two countries. It is probably much more difficult for the United States and China to fall into war than it used to be because we’re now in a new age where our world is much more intertwined. Unlike the Cold War era, where there hadn’t been any economic activity between the two powers, we depend on each other very much today. If we all work together in multilateral or regional frameworks, we probably could see a war avoided between the U.S. and China. Let’s not pursue a Cold War and decoupling because that is very dangerous for all of us.
PANEL II

Alliances, Blocs, & Security Communities: Sources of Stability or Instability in East Asia?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- China’s most recent Party Congress Report indicates that it no longer takes the reform era’s presumption of an era of prolonged peace and stability as a given for the first time, instead conceding that conflict is possible but not inevitable.

- While unable to build a formal alliance system to counterweight Washington’s global security umbrella, observers should not underestimate China’s coalition strategy towards the Global South, which seeks to marshal pre-emptive support rather than force multipliers.

- The Western drive towards firming up alliance systems may make sense in immediate reaction to Russia, but it has had the secondary effect of re-energizing Japan’s latest National Security Strategy vis-a-vis its security concerns with Beijing.

- Diplomacy has been an underutilized component of managing competition with China given its international behaviour could potentially be much less restrained — particularly more robust action in support of Russia.

- India’s distancing from Ukraine and its commitment to maintaining relations with Russia in spite of Western pressure demonstrate the world order is no longer unipolar, nor will it be bipolar, but the strategic imaginations of the U.S. and Europe have not yet grasped this.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS
On America’s role as well as its security partnerships and alliances in preserving the peace and stability in East Asia:

The existence of the United States and its alliances has been an anchor for peace and stability in the region. The understanding is that if you do not have the right capabilities or if you do not have a credible guarantee to protect your allies you could invite windows of opportunities for land grabs that could destabilize the region and lead to a broader conflict. As we saw in the National Security Strategy, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the new National Defense Strategy published earlier this year, there’s a recognition that the United States cannot play a stabilizing role in the region alone and it needs its allies to contribute more. It needs to ensure that the capabilities are there to continue stabilizing the region. Stability, above all else, is the goal of the alliance.

On the impacts of the European security situation on Japanese security thinking:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has absolutely been a wake-up call for Japan first and foremost. Something has changed in Japan ever since the invasion. Support for increased defence spending has never been higher. Domestic political conditions are a lot more permissive for Japan to strengthen its capabilities. What this will mean for the regional security environment remains to be seen.

On China’s lack of reciprocity towards its neighbour’s diplomatic efforts:

There is interest in Japan in preserving its relationship with China. We saw a very hawkish Japanese government take the challenge of diplomacy with China very seriously. But it takes two. Beijing’s response to Japan’s overtures has been lacklustre and unenthusiastic. Clearly, countries are not blindly following the U.S. into hostilities with China. There have been efforts by countries to continue to have
a constructive dialogue with China. But we haven’t seen a whole lot of interest in reciprocity from Beijing.

Jeremy Paltiel
Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Professor, Carleton University
— Canada

On Canada’s perspective on AUKUS and U.S.-Canada relations:

Canada has had a relevant consistent trajectory of not putting its security investments in the Asian theatre. This goes back to the Second World War. Canada has been extremely reluctant to invest heavily in any kind of defence structure in every period. The complete lack of military and security representation in the Indo-Pacific advisory committee indicates that the Canadian government has no intention of increasing its investment in the region in any significant way. There is a fear of missing out on the rhetorical level, but at the practical level, we are not going there.

On the exaggeration of Chinese ambitions:

Although the world is dangerous and China has a national plan second to none by the 2030s, we shouldn’t assert on that basis that China is aiming to be like the United States in every respect it doesn’t or that it wants to demolish the liberal world. We should realistically assess what the threats are. There is a real danger after the 20th Party Congress. There is a risk at least that China will be headed toward two kinds of stagnation: Brezhyniev-style political stagnation and Japanese-style economic stagnation. We should take those into account when we’re talking about China’s capacities and its relations with others.

On China’s rhetoric regarding the superiority of socialism:

President Xi has said publicly that China does not intend to overthrow any government. He says this because he’s drawing a distinction from the Maoist period
of rhetoric and politics when that was China's official policy. Trying to put words in his mouth on the superiority of socialism is nonsense. The statements regarding the superiority of socialism are actually very much in line with President Biden's statements about the fight between democracy and authoritarianism. Both are meant to be aimed at a domestic audience. President Xi's remarks are meant to cement the hierarchy of the CCP and its rule of China against hollowing out and erosion by liberal ideas caused by globalization.

However, this rhetoric also leads to the notion of China providing an alternative for the developing world. 70% of countries of the UN do not necessarily want to live only under the Washington Consensus. While China is stressing that its model of development is unique to its own and cannot be copied and while China is not exporting its way of life, China is providing aid and projecting a state-centric model of development. But this does not constitute the overthrow of the liberal order.

On Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy:

It is important for Canada to be a good ally of the United States. As a result of the 3M affair - the detention of Meng and arrests of the two Michaels - there has been a sea change in Canadian policy. The event led to a wholesale securitization of Canada's policy towards China in every spectrum. As revealed by an article from the WSJ, this was a direct intention of John Bolton, former national security advisor to former U.S. President Donald Trump. In accordance with that, we are adopting an Indo-Pacific Strategy to show that we are a good ally. But our capacities and interests are still NATO-focused, Europe-focused, and to the extent we can, Ukraine-focused. We're not going to be shifting resources away toward the Pacific. Our Indo-Pacific Strategy will reflect those two sides of it. On the one hand, we are a good ally and we support the United States. On the other hand, no new resources will be provided to make any particular impact in Asia.
On the implications of AUKUS for the larger region:

All kinds of risks and downsides come with the AUKUS deal. What is its message for non-proliferation? Is every country now going to seek to have nuclear submarines? Some countries are caught in the middle. Indonesia, for example, could become a free fire zone if U.S. subs are surging up from Australia. But most importantly, this deal will cause Russia and China to cooperate ever more closely in the strategic realm, including the undersea realm. The two countries already cooperate a lot on the development of UAVs and commercial submarines. They might now cooperate on a nuclear submarine project. Overall, the deal is likely to do more damage than good for the security of Asia.

On Japan’s security environment:

Threats to Japan are seriously exaggerated. I would caution that the Senkaku issue has put Americans in a bizarre position of contemplating nuclear war over a rock with some goats on it. That’s everything that is wrong with U.S. Defense Policy. We need to be very cautious and Japan has to be very cautious. Japan can’t move away from China so it’s going to have to learn to get along with China. Putting it all in on deterrence and hoping for the best in the Taiwan Strait is not a good strategy. Japan needs to use a lot more smart diplomacy.

On the implications of decoupling:

If we strengthen the QUAD endlessly and if we alienate China in an effort to isolate its economy, we may end up with something that looks like the 1950s. Decoupling is very unwise and this feeds to China’s worst fears about containment. They will certainly take steps to counter. A lot of states will find themselves in between and both the U.S. and China will twist their arms. We’ll all be worse off
with these efforts.

China is already hell-bent on becoming more self-sufficient in terms of its economy and high technology. Decoupling will only feed more to their determination. It also should be noted that the more we decouple, and the more China becomes self-sufficient, the more willing China will be to use force in the Taiwan Straits. The trends are very dangerous, and gloomy on all fronts, and we really need a much more enlightened policy. The word, economic interdependence is rarely heard these days but it remains a powerful tool.

On Scholz’s visit to China and pathway forward:

Scholz’s visit to Beijing is a very big development and is the way to go. Instead of going back to the 1950s and having two Cold War blocs stare eyeball to eyeball, we need to break that down with these kinds of cross-cutting cleavages. Let’s not make the mistake we made in Europe by developing this extremely hostile paradigm and just escalating and counter-escalating until we get to a war. Let’s search for a more inclusive paradigm of Asia-Pacific security that doesn’t constantly treat China as an enemy. Let’s strive for diplomatic solutions that involve trade and engagement.

On China’s coalition-building strategy:

We should acknowledge that China has a coalition-building strategy. It is no longer isolated as we think it is on the international stage. This can be seen in China’s convening power in the UN, including at the Human Rights Council, where it manages to gather a superior number of countries around its position. The same can be seen on the harder side of politics, where China is developing a
counter-alliance strategy. Under President Xi Jinping, China is clearly positioning itself against alliances in general. It’s not looking to sign any alliance treaty with anyone and the Chinese government considers the alliances are outdated and heavy-burdened. The government thinks it is more in the interest of China to develop alternative strategic partnerships in various forms.

China has a very clear-cut strategy to develop a coalition. It is based on the postulation that one may develop security ties through economic ties. China considers some of its initiatives such as the BRI as one way among others to develop a network of partnerships. Indeed, President Xi Jinping is not talking about alliances but talking about enlarging his circle of friends.

We shouldn’t undermine China’s ability to gather friends by just looking at numbers at the UN. We should also consider China’s activism in several international organizations such as the SCO and to a lesser extent the G20 and BRICS. While these are not security initiatives, we cannot dismiss China’s activism in promoting its agenda to shape priorities according to its own interests.

We may question how China can compete against a strong alliance if it does not have formal allies of its own. Aside from economic partnerships and diplomatic activism, China also seeks to develop meaningful security ties through arms exports and joint military exercises. While China does not expect its partners such as Russia to militarily support its actions, China does expect its partners to position themselves to China’s position.

On alliance revivalism in Europe:

Traditionally, there has been a divergence in the hierarchy of threat perception among European member states. Some states saw Russia as the main threat while others saw China as the main threat. Now, given China’s closer positioning towards Russia, there is now a convergence of threat perception. Member states are now saying that both China and Russia should be considered a threat.

The growing consensus among EU member states’ threat perception has translated into greater interest in transatlantic cooperation to address the threat and also jointly find ways to respond and coordinate hard power responses. Alli-
ance-building and transatlantic coordination have become keywords here in Europe.

On ideological competition with China:

Since the 18th Party Congress, President Xi has been talking about the superiority of socialism over capitalism and is talking about fighting Western hostile forces not just domestically but also abroad. We have entered a fight between political systems and China, to an extent, wants to demolish the liberal world. The ideological competition is there and should be acknowledged because it has become reality.

On the China-Russia partnership:

We have been talking about a “marriage of convenience” between China and Russia for 8 years now since the annexation of Crimea. It’s time to acknowledge that the bilateral relationship between the two countries is much more than that now. There exists a conceptual and ideological convergence between the two and there have been joint military exercises conducted by both sides. Yes, China can do more to support Russia today but China is importing a lot of Russian gas and oil and this has an effect on the effectiveness of sanctions. China is also exporting semiconductors to Russia and supporting Russia diplomatically at various frameworks including the G20. In sum, we should be realistic about the rapport de force.

Andrew Latham
Nonresident Fellow, Defense Priorities; Professor, Macalester College
— Canada / United States

On the role of alliances through the lens of great power competition:

When we look at alliances through the lens of great power competition, we get limitless competition - particularly between the U.S. and China - and we get an
implicit desire to create a global NATO where it is us vs. them. Not only is this mis-analogizing the current moment but it opens us up to this notion of limitless competition. This, in turn, frames alliances in a very destructive light.

On the danger zone or potential Chinese decline:

The underlying dynamic behind the strengthening of alliances and security blocs is radical insecurity and fear. However, those fears are exaggerated and overblown. We forget that China is, as a great power, going out of business. The country is falling off a demographic cliff, its population is aging rapidly, its economy is faltering, and it is facing geopolitical counterbalancing in the region. The real danger from China is what happens when the Chinese leadership recognizes that its country is plateauing, faltering, and falling. That’s the danger or the danger zone.

On India's role in security community-building in East Asia:

India underscores another reality that is hard for some people in Washington to wrap their minds around. This is not Cold War 2.0. This is not a bipolar world where everybody lines up. India has always had an autonomous foreign policy and grand strategy. That hasn’t changed. Where India’s interests and vision intersect with those of the United States and others it cooperates. And it cooperates in a way that’s consistent with its strategic culture. This means no formal alliances such as NATO but more nimble, flexible, and agile arrangements like the QUAD. To the extent that India shares the United States and others' concerns about a rising China, it’s hardly surprising that India, the United States, Australia, Japan, and others will collaborate and cooperate.

The unipolar moment is dead and done with. The new bipolar moment has been stillborn. It’s a very multipolar world perhaps with three powers at the top of the tables: India, China, and the United States. These are the three powers we need to keep our eye on. India, at least in Washington’s collective strategic imagination often slides out of that picture.

On North Korea:

There is a vibe shift in South Korea. Opinion polls suggest South Korean people are very much in favour when push comes to shove, of acquiring their own nucle-
They are fearful of what the North Korean regime might get up to. The fear might not be justified but it’s real. As Thucydides reminds us, one of the big drivers in human affairs is fear. How do you allay or assuage or mitigate that fear if you are South Korean? There are only two ways. We either allow South Korea to acquire their own nuclear weapons or they need an ironclad security guarantee from the United States. The American nuclear umbrella needs to be a bit more reliable as it is being called into question.
PANEL III

Ottawa's Indo-Pacific Strategy: National Interests & Regional Responses

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• There is a need to sincerely recognize U.S. ambitions to economically contain China and the bifurcation of the world economy that this may result in, but there is no Canadian consensus on what kind of global economic order it wishes to support.

• Success is not a matter of simply translating strategic talking points into actionable policy, but also genuinely identifying what kind of Indo-Pacific nation Canada seeks to be while not falling into empty rhetoric that means nothing to the region.

• Canada’s biggest bottleneck for creating a bigger economic footprint in the Indo-Pacific is the lack of physical trade infrastructure to bring its commodities to the market where there is true Asian demand for them — energy in particular.

• Ottawa's rhetoric about a rules-based order falls flat in the majority of Asia and the terminology of the Indo-Pacific and ‘likeminded’ states is frequently divorced from the realities of how most regional states view international relations.

• The trajectory of Canada-China relations appears increasingly wedded to structural issues in the Sino-American relationship, but there is room for Canada to strategically borrow from ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific if it wishes to carve out a more distinct regional voice.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS
On a push-pull analysis of Canadian engagement in the Indo-Pacific:

In terms of pull factors in Asia, there’s a clear demand for a greater Canadian supply of natural resources, services trade, and foreign direct investment - particularly in areas related to sustainable growth and infrastructure development. That said, the vast majority of Canadian investment that went into Asia over the past five years went into Australia and China, not the countries in Southeast Asia where the demand is so strong.

On the push factor, Canada seeks to build influence within the region to advance its trade and its investment relations to support sustainable and inclusive growth and to help with micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise development. These are all areas that overlap with the region’s pull factors and where Canada can make significant progress relatively early and through a small amount of effort. The only thing standing in the way of a greater Canadian economic footprint in the region seems to include the lack of supply from Canada around natural resources, the unfamiliarity with opportunities and conditions outside of its more traditional economies, and a low threshold for risk on the side of Canadian investors.

Canada also has political and diplomatic aims in the region, including support for the rules-based order, cooperation with the non-geographic West around an Indo-Pacific ideal, support for democracy throughout the region, strengthening relations with the in-between countries, dealing with Chinese coercion, and supporting human rights and good governance.

While Asia is open to engagement with Canada on its own terms, there’s decid-
edly less support for the non-economic components of the push factor - particularly among the states that aren’t part of what we now are increasingly calling the Global West.

On the idea of the rules-based order, for instance, one finds little interest among the states in South and Southeast Asia and China for the concept. Indeed, if you raise the concept of a rules-based order in the region, nearly anyone who works on security or strategy in the region outside of Canberra or Tokyo will likely respond that there is no such thing as a rules-based order.

Similarly, on Western state alignment in Asia, one finds sentiments ranging from cynicism to outright opposition across the region. While states in the region are interested in working with Western states like Canada, they are by no means looking for Western state leadership and sometimes see Western state involvement in Asia as unwanted interference. This is particularly true as the Global West coalesces around an idea of Indo-Pacific strategies and concepts that sometimes has very little regard for regional demands, regional preferences, and even regional agency.

On democratic promotion and strengthening, one finds even less alignment between Canada’s hope for the region and regional developments. Across Asia, democracies are not only in decline but public support for democracy is decreasing as regional models of governance from Singapore to China become more appealing for their ability to provide stability and public goods.

When it comes to in-between countries, non-democratic countries of strategic significance, one does certainly find the willingness to engage with Canada but really on terms that support their own national interests. If Canada pursues pull relationships with these in-betweener s, it will receive warm reception. If Canada attempts to bring them alongside in a democracies-versus-autocracies view of the world — as the Deputy Prime Minister’s speech suggested Canada might adopt — it will almost certainly find a more chilly reception.

One finds little support for the idea of Chinese coercion within Asia outside very narrow areas of national interest such as territorial disputes in the South or East China Sea. We simply don’t see much evidence across the Global South or Asia’s
developing states that China is viewed solely as a threat.

Lastly, we can see in regional discourse and data that developing states take a different view of human rights in the region, seeing economic opportunity and stable governance as more important indicators than human rights around religious and ethnic issues in some instances.

All these observations indicate a significant gap between what the region wants from Canada and what it believes it can bring to the region. Not only are these priorities out of tune with one another but they can actually be oppositional with the push factors creating conditions that could ultimately undermine that pull factor — particularly if those push factors become the driving thrust behind Canada’s approach to the region.

On the current state of Canada-China relations:

There’s a range of obstacles between Canada-China relations at the strategic level and they are likely going to become more pronounced in the coming months and perhaps years due to structural issues over which Canada doesn’t have a lot of control. The elections in the U.S. for example, the growing support of the Global West for Taiwan, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the new empowerment of NATO. These developments are going to introduce a degree of strategic instability into the Asia-Pacific region that Canada will ultimately have to internalize in its approach to China. It will be very difficult to maintain a balanced strategic relationship with China.

On the U.S. logic of the Indo-Pacific concept:

The logic inherent from the U.S. perspective was this is a China containment strategy. This is about putting warheads on foreheads. That was the language being used around the Indo-Pacific Strategy and that was the determination at that time to switch U.S. Pacific Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. This is the idea to expand the AOR to include the Indian Ocean thereby bringing America’s military and naval assets from the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca into the South China Sea — and you could expand your parameter for thinking about threat perceptions towards China to include those different areas.
On what Canada’s immediate priorities in the region should be:

Under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework, there are three things we can do immediately. One is to de-emphasize the relationship with like-minded states. We have to talk more about inclusivity and broader engagement. We also need to de-emphasize our partnership with the Global West. We should look for opportunities to conduct omnidirectional diplomacy. Throw as much diplomacy out there as you can, engage wherever you can, and see what works and doesn’t work - fixing the airplane as you fly it. Ultimately, we must look at institutions in the region and understand how Canada can bring value to them and how they strengthen Canada’s position in the region. This is closely aligned with strategic integration. We should make ourselves present at every table to be there and be part of the discussion. Fundamentally, if there is such a thing as a rules-based order, it’s institutions, norms, rules, relationships, and the links that are formed between organizational integration. So if we want to strengthen the rules-based order in Asia, we must first look at the Indigenous institutions because those are the ones that reflect regional values and priorities.

Stéphanie Martel
Distinguished Fellow, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada; Fellow, Centre for International & Defence Policy & Assistant Professor, Queen’s University
— Canada

On Canada’s difficulty in turning rhetoric to action:

Our difficulty in turning rhetoric into concrete action when it comes to figuring out how to play the Indo-Pacific game stems from the fact that we haven’t found a clear voice when it comes to the Asia Pacific yet. We don’t have a coherent understanding of who Canada is or wants to be as an Indo-Pacific nation grounded in clear answers to fundamental questions: What are our objectives? What principles should guide the pursuit of these objectives? Who are we in relation to others? And where do we want to make a difference and how?
The formulation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy serves as an opportunity for Canada to do two things: Take a substantial leap forward in figuring out the story it wants to tell about itself as a regional actor and then tell it convincingly. The problem is not rhetoric in itself. It’s empty rhetoric. We also need to get the story right in both words and tone. The narrative needs to be anchored in a clear set of guiding principles that makes sense for Canada and align with regional perspectives in the Indo-Pacific.

On the strategic context that Canada finds itself in:

World politics see the coexistence between elements of competition and elements of cooperation as something that’s not new. What we see as changing is that the equilibrium between these two elements is tipping toward the more confrontational aspects. When it comes to an aspiring Middle Power like Canada, we do have an interest in offering a position of cooler-head spirit. However, it is worrying to see that this has become less and less possible to be developed at this time. For Canada, there is a clear interest in avoiding or making sure that we can play down zero-sum binary thinking of world politics as much as possible.

On what should be Canada’s immediate priorities in the region:

In the immediate future, we should tone down our fear of missing out. Keeping our energies on what we’ve been doing such as reaching the status of a strategic partner with ASEAN, entering the East Asian Summit, and possibly the ADM+ down the road is much more important. These are platforms where it is possible to draw a connection between these spheres of groups of friends. Being able to secure invitations at key forums as opportunities to communicate our regional narrative around the Indo-Pacific is vital.

Paul Evans
HSBC Chair in Asian Research & Professor, School of Public Policy & Global Affairs, University of British Columbia
— Canada
On China’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific Strategy:

You can’t have an Indo-Pacific Strategy without having a China framework, a China dimension, or a China angle. China’s absolutely integral to it. The Indo-Pacific is much bigger than China but because of the presence of China and the antipathy that has created and the opportunities that it has created, you can’t leave out China. China has got to be part of the picture as the very concept of the Indo-Pacific was fundamentally created by the perception of a rising China and a changing power balance.

On the significance of U.S. semiconductor restrictions:

It’s the competition over foundational technologies that is going to be fundamental to the balance of power in Asia. It’s the 4th industrial revolution that is occurring and who is going to control it. The United States and its Chips Act opens a whole new phase. This is not about competing with China. This is about containing China’s economic development in a crucial sector. This is a step towards a comprehensive economic containment of China. The United States is not going to be outcompeted. It is not going to lose its position of supremacy.

We are in a new generation of technonationalism. We’ve seen this developing in steps but this act isn’t a step but a leap bigger. It’s not an effort to limit China in these areas but strangle Chinese capabilities in this area. This development is likely going to be extended into other sectors as well. That’s the story for the United States and one we should be watching very closely because it fundamentally challenges the idea of a rule-based international order. This is an alteration to a pattern of globalization. We talk about decoupling and friendshoring but this is a big step towards the bifurcation of the global economy.

On the current state of Canada-China relations:

We are in a dark decade of the Canada-China relationship. There aren’t many positive signs of where we’re going to be able to go at the strategic level with China. The metaphor to describe the bilateral relations is that of a frozen lake. We’re going to be dealing with a period of pretty hard ice on top. But beneath that layer of ice, there are a lot of things that are going to continue. Here’s the caveat: Until recently, one could believe that we could try to work with China on some
elements of reinforcing the global economic institutions and some of the UN and other organizations. That’s going to be really tough right now and particularly selling it to the Canadian public.

On regional wisdom and approaches to the Indo-Pacific concept:

The Indo-Pacific can cover a variety of possible strategic frames. We could learn most from three places. The first is Japan because Japan was the first to break away from the narrow American conception and to build inclusiveness into the process. You don’t like China but you don’t exclude China. You push back against China. The second place is Australia. The Australians live at a level of sophistication on this discussion. The third place is to reinvent ASEAN Centrality - South-east Asians’ ways of trying to navigate through a great power rivalry. Learn their foreign policy orientation so far as we can to practice nimble diplomacy with limits.

On what should be Canada’s immediate priorities in the region:

From a strategic perspective, Canada should hold hands with our American friends but not go any further on a first date. This is the idea that we are going to support America in its efforts to maintain its dominance in an era where we know the balance of power is shifting. The fundamental issue for us in the Indo-Pacific is how we’re going to manage our relationship with the U.S. We can pursue some of our independent ideas but how far we are able to get offside from our American friends is a key question. This tension will continue to be with us until a cabinet can reach a working arrangement. Before that happens, the Indo-Pacific will be everything and nothing.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Asia’s energy markets have changed significantly in the fallout of the Russia-Ukraine war with India becoming a formidable importer and Japan giving strong incentives for supplier diversification which presents opportunities for Canada.

• The energy transition is motivating the rekindling of nuclear power and greater deployment of renewables in Asia given the falling costs of solar, but in China, this is being accelerated by serious policy measures to achieve decarbonization targets by 2030 and net zero by 2060.

• China’s COVID economic slowdown has been a mixed blessing for global energy markets by taking a huge channel of demand out of the running, so recovering Chinese economic activity in the coming year will make competition over oil and gas even more contentious.

• Energy sanctions on Russia have sharpened China’s structural concerns with energy security which underlines its status as a top buyer of U.S. LNG but also as a dependable market for producers to secure long-term energy contracts relative to other importers.

• Genuine decoupling efforts from the Chinese economy are an understated but significant inhibitor to the global energy transition, particularly for other emerging economies, given China’s integral position in renewables manufacturing and the critical minerals value chain.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS
On whether East Asian countries can pivot away from Russian energy:

Russian oil and gas resources are crucially important for Japan as a source of import. 9% of Japanese gas demands and 4-5% of Japanese oil demands are dependent on Russia. More importantly, Japan finds importance in Russia due to its need to diversify away from its oil imports from the Middle East. Despite Russia becoming a real problem, Japan still needs to import from Russia to a certain extent.

In terms of oil flow, we have seen a drastic change. India has now become a major importer of Russian oil. The country now imports about 1 million barrels per day and countries such as China and Turkey have increased their imports. We have yet to see what would happen to oil flow after the sanctions systems changes in December.

Natural gas is the most affected sector. We have seen massive surges in LNG imports to Europe as a response to the lack of Russian natural gas. This has sucked up enormous amounts of spot LNG cargoes away from Asia. So countries like Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are in trouble due to a lack of access to affordable natural gas.

On energy transition in East Asia:

The energy transition in East Asia varies by country. For Japan, one of the major steps they have taken is the use of more nuclear power. If this happens, this would surely reduce the LNG input requirements for Japan and the LNG cargo can be redirected to other countries in the region with more dire needs. The new administration in Korea is also changing its policy towards the use of more
nuclear power. Both countries are looking to diversify away from fossil fuels towards nuclear energy and other forms of renewables such as wind and solar. In the short term, firing up nuclear plants would have a massive impact on the LNG market because the energy produced by one nuclear reactor is equivalent to 1 million tons of LNG per year.

On an emerging energy crisis:

China has announced very ambitious decarbonization targets. Their growth in renewables, specifically solar and wind, is quite massive. They are leading the world by providing about 40% of the global additional renewable capacity. However, this is still not enough to replace the power generation requirements given their high demand for energy. Unfortunately and fortunately, China’s energy demand has now grown so far this year due to the COVID restrictions placed by its government. However, if China drops its restrictions and returns to its projected growth path of energy demand then the whole world will be in trouble. This will lead to high competition over limited resources - in particular natural gas. In this respect, the outlook for next year is even more uncertain with China’s potential growth.

On the timeline for East Asia’s energy transition:

We need to be aware of the differences in timelines between emerging Asian economies to those in Europe or North America. We need to make sure that their increasing energy demand would be met in a secure and affordable way. In that respect, energy exporters such as the United States and Canada are very important.

On addressing methane leakage:

In terms of achieving both the sustainability requirement and energy security, there’s a lot that the oil and gas producers need to do. For instance, methane leakage is a significant issue in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. The capturing of such leakages is thus critical and it also pays as the captured carbon can then be resold on the market. Addressing this issue would effectively lower greenhouse gas emissions and enhance energy security for nations in the short term.
On the implications of the war in Ukraine on energy transition:

The War in Ukraine is surely accelerating decarbonization. While there are some setbacks, such as countries switching back to coal and other fossil fuels to meet their energy needs, policy actions by governments across the world indicate otherwise. The EU has Repowering EU and the U.S. has the Inflation Reduction Act. At this moment, the clean energy transition and the decarbonization of energy systems are not only about climate change mitigation but also about enhancing energy security. Countries such as Germany are switching back to nuclear temporarily while also putting additional incentives for renewables and advanced low-carbon technologies like hydrogen or ammonia. In this respect, the War in Ukraine has caused a short-term setback. Yet, from a long-term perspective, the incident will surely accelerate the low carbon clean energy transition across the globe.

On the implications of the war in Ukraine on East Asian energy markets:

The picture varies across the region because exposure to Russian flows of oil, gas, and coal varies by country. The vulnerability and exposure to spot markets — especially for LNG — are different. Some countries have oil index contracts and some countries rely less on spot volumes upon. It’s easy to qualify everybody as losers in this situation and it’s really hard to talk about winners.

There’s a bigger question of — in the eyes of developing countries — how the West has outsourced its supply insecurity onto developing economies and really rendered energy supplies more complicated and prohibitive for some countries. It’s interesting for us to discuss whether these geopolitical fault lines are going to be redrawn now and to what extent they will be shaping and impacting markets.

On energy transition in China:

The issue for China is how to move away from coal, which represents 55% of its energy mix and introduces more renewables. Oil and gas are 19% of the energy mix with gas making up only 9%. The response has been really all of the above. There’s nuclear, there’s hydro, there are renewables, there’s a focus on energy storage, and there’s also gas.
China’s thinking on energy security has changed quite a bit. In the last statements and policy plans, there really is a talk about system-wide resilience. The 20th Party Congress really highlighted how the West is a threat to China. Western sanctions, for instance, have been one of the biggest disruptors of flows to China. Indeed, the perception is very much that energy security is something that’s created by the West and not Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On supply and demand considerations for the global energy transition:

“Is it more on the supply side or the demand side?” This is a question that is relevant for a lot of emerging economies. Certainly in the West, we’re focused on greening our supplies and replicating our way of life by greening it when there’s a lot that should be done on the demand side. We shouldn’t be consuming the way we are, we shouldn’t be flying as much as we are, and we shouldn’t be eating avocados from Mexico in London. All of these things are not talked about but they’re equally important. This is an open question for China and other emerging economies.

On East Asia’s energy transition timeline:

Factors such as technological decoupling and geopolitical fracturing are huge risks, especially as we talk about China. Certainly in Europe, there’s a sense that China is potentially the new Russia and that Europe is at risk of replacing its reliance on Russian gas with a reliance on Chinese new energy materials and supplies. This is a very problematic way of looking at the energy transition. These discussions of friend-shoring and re-shoring risk setting us back in terms of our progress and time while we have no time for the energy transition.

On opportunities for Canada-China energy cooperation:

Beyond being perceived by China as friendly or unfriendly, Canada has available resources and the ability to supply China with all the fossil fuels and all the materials that it will need for its energy transition. If you look at future gas balances in China on the supply side, it is not looking great. If we assume that there’s another pipeline from Russia then Russia accounts for ⅓ of imports into China by the early 2030s. The other big LNG suppliers are the U.S. and Australia, which can be problematic when viewed from a geopolitical perspective. So having another supplier in that mix would certainly be a good thing. Diversity is key and
Canada has an opportunity here.

On Canadian opportunities for energy leadership:

For Canada, taking a lead on reporting measurement and verification of methane emissions from its oil and gas from the upstreams that are from the Wellhead to the transport will place it as a global leader because that is what needs to happen. Asian buyers are becoming increasingly conscious of the carbon and GHG footprint of their imports.

On energy transportation:

There’s a lot more oil and natural gas being transported by ship instead of a pipeline at the global level. The recognition that there is a higher proportion of energy transported by sea is important given where we’re likely to be headed – a combination of embargos and G7 price caps. This is going to put more emphasis and focus on which tankers are being used; if they have insurance; and insurance from whom. Transit time of fossil fuel energy is likely going to take longer to their destination. They may have intermediate destinations along the way as well. Transportation costs of getting energy to Asia are likely to increase.

On the energy transition in East Asia:

To cushion the impact of rising and volatile energy prices on their consumers, some countries in East Asia are taking the opportunity to not only subsidize fossil fuels but also provide more funds to support feed-in tariffs to allow more rollout of renewable capacity.

On the importance of Canadian clarity:

Rachel Ziemba
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Energy, Economics, & Security Program, Center for a New American Security
— United States
Counteracting and providing clarity on the state and development of Canadian energy infrastructure — such as its pipelines — is important. Businesses and investors need clarity on what things might go ahead and what won’t make investment decisions.

Lisa Baiton
President & Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
— Canada

On what Canada can do to foster energy security in East Asia:

Canada is in a strong position to help East Asian countries offset their dependence on Russian energy supplies - particularly in helping them meet their needs for LNG. First, we have the resources. Canada is the 6th largest producer of natural gas in the world and we have some of the most affordable natural gas production on the planet. We also have oil reserves that surpass Russia’s. Second, we have efficient transportation routes. When it comes to seaborne transportation of crude and LNG, it is about half the distance from Canada’s Northwest coast to Japan when you compare that to the U.S. Gulf Coast. This has a bearing on LNG shipping to East Asia and related GHG emissions. Third, Canada produces some of the lowest-emission natural gas and LNG in the world. Because of our flaring and venting practices, Canada’s natural gas production emits less methane compared to other jurisdictions. Due to our colder climate, it takes less energy to cool natural gas and liquefy it for shipping. There’s a lot of opportunity for LNG on Canada’s West Coast. In terms of addressing East Asian energy security and having Canada be part of the solution, it will be really important for governments in East Asia to not only work with our industry but also to work with Federal and Provincial governments in Canada to expedite projects.

On policy recommendations:

We need to put our heads above the parapet and look at the competitive land-
scape. The upstream industry will be a critical piece of the energy transition. Not enough attention is being paid to what's happening here in Canada in terms of the global leading innovation and technology to take carbon out of production. Capital flows are global and they will go to places where there are the most incentives and the greatest rates of return. Canada has an opportunity here to seize that global thought leadership in GHG emission technology and innovation and keep all of that alpha here at home. Otherwise, we can see that go to other jurisdictions like the U.S.
KEY TAKEAWAYS

- It is important to understand that many stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific recognize fundamental discrepancies in the application of, abidance to, and enforcement of maritime law that go beyond Beijing.

- Upholding international arbitration is a key mechanism for resolving intractable disputes at sea, but this does not easily address disagreements that are not bilateral at their core but entangled among multiple claimants.

- It will be important to support ongoing negotiations among ASEAN and China over a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as a means of preventive diplomacy and crisis mitigation that builds on existing legal pillars such as UNCLOS.

- In response to Washington’s regional naval posture, China has opted for a naval strategy of maritime denial rather than sheer control in order to distance any potential conflict — Taiwan in particular — from its immediate coastline.

- An emphasis on great power competition when assessing maritime security in the Indo-Pacific neglects regional understandings of the concept that are often more concerned with its human and climate security dimensions.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS

On Chinese behaviour in maritime East Asia:

Cdr. Jonathan Odom
Military Professor, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy
— United States
The PRC employs all instruments of its national power in a strategic, comprehensive, and strident manner in maritime East Asia with minimal to no accommodation to other states. This approach has caused significant concerns among other states, particularly in the context of maritime security and law.

On China’s nine-dash line:

The PRC is the only claimant not just in East Asia but anywhere in the world who asserts an absurd claim based on ambiguous dashed lines that are completely unjustifiable under international law. The existence of this line is fairly well known but what cannot be understated is just how big of an obstacle China’s insistence on that line as a legitimate claim is to any potential for real progress in managing and resolving the dispute.

In 1947 at the end of World War II, a survey team from the Republic of China drew the predecessor of this line on a map when they returned to Taipei to brief their government’s leadership. The predecessor line was intended to summarize only a sovereignty claim to the islands located within the line and not a claim to any special status of the waters therein. However, Beijing has attempted to transform this dashed line with a limited meaning to some sort of super claim in order to justify whatever China wants in the South China Sea and in total disregard of what our international law allows coastal states to claim.

Today, six years past the tribunal on the South China Sea, China continues to insist that areas should be shared where this unjustifiable dashed line overlaps with justifiable EEZs. China’s dashed line claim is solely responsible for eliminating the existence of any ZOPA in the South China Sea situation.

On the capacity of maritime law to resolve territorial disputes (UNCLOS):

This is the only way that these disputes are going to be resolved. There’s nothing that Beijing can say to Manila that is going to convince them that their claim is superior. There’s also nothing that Manila is going to be able to say to Beijing, The same applies between Beijing and Tokyo. The only way that these claims can be resolved is through a third party. This is because the policies in each of these government systems have promised their people that these islands belong to them, or this water space belongs to them. We’re never going to resolve any of
these disputes through negotiations.

Yurika Ishii
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Security Studies, National Defense Academy of Japan
— Japan

On the South China Sea Code of Conduct:

The code of conduct that’s being discussed basically surrounds the prohibition of the use of force, the safe use of the sea, and reducing risks of conflict. These areas are already provided in other instruments that are legally binding - including UNCLOS, UN Charter, and so on. It’s important to have confidence-building measures and a code of conduct could be a vehicle to establish trust, but we do have international norms that regulate the same content already in place.

Darshana M. Baruah
Fellow, South Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Visiting Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
— United States / India

On the region’s perspective of what constitutes maritime security:

When we talk about maritime security from Washington’s point of view and a lot of the bigger powers, it’s essentially always shipped toward Naval strategy. It is very much a military-dominant conversation. In contrast, from a regional perspective - a small state and littoral perspective - maritime security is far wider and often on the non-traditional spectrum. It’s about illegal fishing, drug, and human trafficking, and most importantly, climate change. Indeed, if you go to a
small island state and you ask them what’s the largest threat the country faces, they will not say it’s an invasion from the U.S. or China. It’ll always be climate change. The definition of security is very different.

On great power behaviour:

From the perspective of the region, China is certainly not the sole country that disregards maritime law. The U.S. and UK have their largest base in Diego Garcia which is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The sovereignty of Diego Garcia is contested by Mauritius. There have been 3 rulings so far and each of these three UN rulings has ruled in favour of Mauritius, saying that the U.S. and UK are illegally occupying the island. Both the U.S. and the UK have refused to acknowledge the verdicts in the UN, claiming it has no right nor the jurisdiction to rule on these matters. Thus, it’s not just China. It is a great power trait or behavior where you disregard international law and international norms. So when Washington goes down the region and proposed the rules-based international order, it’s essentially a conversation about which rules and whose order. To an extent, International law and norms are only imposed on smaller powers that do not have the military strength to challenge them.

On the challenge to resolving the disputes in the SCS:

When it comes to the South China Sea, there are multiple players involved. Specifically, there are six nations involved in total and the overwhelming focus is on the dispute between five countries and Beijing. Yet, we need to remind ourselves that there are also overlapping disputes between and amongst the claimants themselves. Thus, even if the disputes were successfully resolved with Beijing, there will still be overlapping disputes among the many claimants. Indeed, the complication of the disputes in the South China Sea is that it’s not bilateral. While the use of maritime law should be the method and framework to go forward in resolving these disputes, it all depends on whether the countries involved agree to this process. This is likely to be difficult given these countries’ respective maritime ambitions.
On China’s strategy towards securing its coastline:

When you’re in Beijing and you’re looking out at the Pacific, what you see is a series of archipelagic island lines which run down from Japan through the Philippines and onto Papua New Guinea — the first island chain — and the key to that the hinge of fate is Taiwan. The criticality of Taiwan in terms of the defence of China from the Chinese perspective is enormous. Secondly, somewhat farther out is the second island chain. What the Chinese have done is pursue a weaker naval power strategy. The Beijing authorities have decided to focus on sea denial then sea control. Their objective is that if there is a conflict with the U.S., it will use all its resources to keep the U.S. Navy at arm’s length from the Chinese coast.

On U.S. challenges toward protecting Taiwan:

If you’re fighting a war over Taiwan at sea, you’ve got to move your ships from the Californian Coast or Hawaii four five thousand miles to operate off Taiwan. It’s a bit like getting in your Jetta and driving from here to Moscow at 30 miles an hour. The Chinese by comparison have 110 miles to go to get to Taiwan. The logistics here are dictated by the enormity of the region’s geography.

On the United States’ forward presence:

There’s a reason why the Americans are in Japan, Guam, South Korea, the Philippines, and once again in Australia. This was the immutable lesson from World War II. Unless you’re close to the Asian shore, you cannot conduct warfare.

On the new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific:

One of the critical elements here is the larger balance of power emerging in Asia
with respect to the Navies of the region. Along with China and the U.S., we are now incorporating India, Australia, and Japan. We now have a relationship of Navies increasingly dedicated to containing or eventually combatting China.
PANEL VI

Economic Regionalism: FTAs, Supply Chains, & Securitization

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Integration between China and the global economy means diversification efforts, especially in Southeast Asia, will inevitably have to contend with Beijing whose trade infrastructure and commercial ties will underwrite the economic activity that Canada seeks to join.

• RCEP cannot be dismissed and is a clear pathway for countries like Canada to pursue a greater economic footprint in Asia

• If CPTPP is the gold standard for Ottawa’s economic governance goals in the region, it should welcome Chinese efforts to join it in order to influence it into greater conformity with its rules — pressure that Canada would not otherwise be able to exert alone.

• A policy of friendshoring is fraught with risk, particularly if it is premised on the belief that conflict is inevitable which may have the unintended consequence of making it more likely and, when paired with ideological values, divisive in Asia.

• Decoupling has the effect of narrowing the options for substitutability and thus diminishing the actual resilience of supply chains, particularly when limitations on trade are dependent on vague or select definitions of trusted partners.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS

Carlo Dade
Director, Trade & Investment Centre, Canada West Foundation; Honourary Senior Fellow, International Development & Global Studies, University of Ottawa
— Canada
On the significance of Canada’s economic relationship with East Asia:

In terms of the importance of the relationship for Canada, economics and trade are front and center. Just under two-thirds of this country’s GDP comes from moving goods, people, money, and ideas in and out of Canada. That is three times more important than for the Americans and half as important as for the Australians. For Canada, trade is where the rubber meets the road for our engagement globally and in the Indo-Pacific region.

On Canada’s Critical Mineral Strategy:

With critical minerals, there is no federal critical mineral strategy. There is an aspirational critical mineral strategy. The reality is that there are provincial critical mineral strategies. The provincial role in Canada is an important perspective when thinking about economics and trade. Things like minerals are 100% a provincial responsibility.

On China’s economic inescapability:

If you try to run away from China, you’re going to run into China – in Indonesia, in India, and even in Brazil. And you’re probably going to be running on the road that the Chinese built. And if there’s a train coming down the track that’s about to hit you it’s going to be a Chinese track and a Chinese train. The thought that you can simply not engage the mainland and leave China behind is something that’s a challenge for Canadian policymakers because we don’t have the understanding that if you run away from China, you still run into China.

Mark Kruger
Opinion Editor, Yicai Global; Senior Fellow, Yicai Research Institute; Senior Fellow, China Institute, University of Alberta
— Canada

On the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:
RCEP is a multilateral trade agreement encompassing 15 countries. It’s the world’s largest regional trade agreement. It covers larger shares of global GDP, larger global goods trade, and global population than the USMCA, the EU-Japan trade agreement, and the CPTPP. Economists have modeled the benefits of RCEP and they find that, by 2030, trade liberalization raise the GDP of the 15 members by an aggregate of 174 billion dollars or about four percent of aggregate GDP. Other countries outside of Asia will be welcome to join the RCEP in the summer of 2023. In a world in which countries are being asked to pick sides, Canada should keep all its options open and enthusiastically and sign up to join RCEP.

On China and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership:

Canada really has an unprecedented opportunity with China’s application to the CPTPP. China wants to join and Canada should welcome discussions with China on how it should accede to the TPP. China wanting something from the international community actually confers on Canada and other CPTPP members a certain amount of leverage in terms of working with China to reform its trade practices.

On friend-shoring and decoupling:

The type of decoupling we are talking about is driven by strategic considerations and not economic ones. Clearly, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, strategic considerations have come to the fore. Minister Freeland put these considerations front and fore in her Brookings speech when she said, “Europe is bracing for a cold and bitter lesson in the strategic folly of economic reliance on countries whose political and moral values are inimical to our own.”

However, it’s not clear how similar political and moral values are a recipe for peace. Consider the centuries during which Europe was racked by war even though the combatants espoused broadly similar political and moral values. From a different perspective, we were able to collaborate with the Soviet Union - whose political and moral values were different from ours - to defeat Nazi Germany.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has understandably led to a taking of sides, we still must remember that we are not at war with China. A trade policy that
presupposed the inevitability of war will have the perverse effect of making war more likely. To add to Canada’s to-do list, perhaps Canada’s first foreign policy responsibility is to see that war does not break out between the United States and China. In terms of trade, Canada can profitably and sustainably trade with anyone as long as we have the backing of the right institutions.

Yeling Tan
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Assistant Professor, University of Oregon
— United States

On rethinking Canada’s economic strategy:

It’s important to think about what kinds of guiding principles should undergird Canadian trade policy. On that front, we need to be concerned about the fragmentation of the global trading system into what we could think of as three different worlds of trade — each of which is undergirded by a different set of guiding principles. Which of these guiding principles serves Canadian interests best should be the one that Canada participates in.

In the first world lies the pre-existing world of open international rules where countries rely on a common set of rules to cooperate and manage conflicts. The WTO provides this main framework. This system is still in place but it is increasingly being outpaced by the development of a sovereignty first world. In this world, we have cooperation overshadowed by a zero-sum view of the world where security concerns eclipse economic cooperation. Instead of cooperation, coercion is the tool of choice. Here, we have punitive unilateral actions that are designed to create barriers to cooperation. At the same time, we have this third world emerging of competing coalitions. In this world, a select group of countries do cooperate but there are divisions between rival spheres. Within a coalition, there might be smoother trade flows and economic cooperation. However, it is not clear whether that are clear rules undergirding this cooperation and if there are a common set of rules to manage conflict within a coalition.
On friendshoring:

Recent events have put forward a number of pressing concerns for a lot of governments and businesses. Most of these surround supply chain resilience and supply chain security. The two are different concepts because they imply different policy responses and different business responses. It’s not clear that friend-shoring hits either of those targets.

If we’re concerned about supply chain resilience, stronger resilience implies greater ease of substitutability. You want to source both domestically and internationally because you never know where the next disruption is going to be coming from. If a firm or business thinks they’re overly reliant on a single source, supply chain resilience implies diversification but not a total exit. And the shifting is going to be driven by the underlying manufacturing and resource capabilities of other countries rather than foreign policy concerns. That kind of diversification logic drives stronger resilience.

If we’re concerned about supply chain security, that falls under a very narrow set of goods. This might mean decoupling, which actually reduces the resilience of supply chains. China’s response to American export controls by building a holistic supply chain production design capacity for semiconductors within its own territorial boundaries implies lower resilience.

Where friend-shoring lies in all of this is highly ambiguous. How resilient can your supply chains be if you’re restricting trade to within a very ambiguous definition of friends? And if friendship and trustworthiness on regime-type considerations are driving your location decisions rather than underlying capabilities, there would be a cost there to resilience. If the goal is security then the policy solution ought to be a lot more targeted and it ought to be in the name of enhancing national security rather than trying to divide the relationship between friends vs. non-friends.
On the CPTPP's importance to Canada:

The CPTPP is not only significant for Canada in the sense that it is the only and largest trade bloc that we belong to in the region, but it’s also making a lot of progress. All 11 members have or are on their way to ratifying the agreement while there is a handful of potential new entrant nations. They include the UK, China, Taiwan, and South Korea. Numbers suggest that the performance of the CPTPP has also been strong. Last year, Canada’s export growth to the CPTPP bloc was 19% while its exports to China were 11%. During the pandemic, Canada’s decline in exports to both China and the United States was more significant than that of the decline to the CPTPP bloc in both 2019 and 2020.

On the need for Canadian promotion of the CPTPP:

For a trade agreement, the CPTPP is one of the most comprehensive agreements in providing a rules-based trading environment that has really enhanced market access capability through actual tariff reduction. Canada, however, is taking a very passive approach when it comes to the promotion of this agreement. We simply wait for other countries to show interest and apply. We are not actively attracting and encouraging new entrants to join despite the market access opportunities our agreement fosters. It is in Canadian interests to do so, especially considering what the U.S. is doing right now with IPEF.

On decoupling and friend-shoring for Canada:

We are talking about decoupling and friend-shoring but who is going to be our friend? When it comes to our relations with the U.S., where do we draw the line? How much are we going to expect to align with U.S. ambitions in terms of export control and in terms of what can be traded and what cannot be traded? This
presents a lot of vulnerability for Canada in thinking this way for the Indo-Pacific where China is by far the largest importer, exporter, and player in every aspect with every single country in the region. Even if we wanted to decouple or run away from China, we’ll still somehow engage with China when diversifying our trade.

On what the Canadian government can and should do:

Businesses move around, adjust strategically, and respond to changes in a much more timely fashion than governments. What the Canadian government should do is provide reliable infrastructure and transportation systems so that Canadian businesses can reach their target markets. The government needs to integrate and enhance our trade infrastructure to allow us to walk the talk when it comes to the trade opportunities that await us in the Indo-Pacific.

Rachel Ziemba
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Energy, Economics, & Security Program, Center for a New American Security
— United States

On the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework:

What we see in IPEF is a number of standards and some goals. There’s not a lot there on the trade liberalization side. What there is a lot more of within IPEF and some of the U.S. bilateral and multilateral groups is U.S.’ wish to use other economic tools. We’ve seen U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan comment on using export controls as a strategic tool. This is a game-changer.

On economic muscle tools:

We are seeing an environment where there is not only more use of coercive restrictive tools but also more positive tools of industrial policy. We are seeing the use of all these tools to achieve political or economic goals. All these tools - whether they are financial sanctions, export controls, investment restrictions, or
outbound investment screening - are not only being used in small countries but also increasingly on a sectoral level. That puts Canada and other U.S. allies in a tough position. Canada should thus stay up with the Americans on the use of these tools while finding allies in both Europe and Asia for a common cause.
PANEL VII

Nuclear Security in East Asia

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• A dogmatic commitment to nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula is not only outdated but counterproductive as Pyongyang views unilateral disarmament as a nonstarter without tangible incentives from Seoul and Washington.

• The credibility of potential security guarantees that are intended to induce North Korean rollback of its weapons capabilities has been weakened under the backdrop of previous history in Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere.

• The longer the nuclear question remains unresolved, the more encouraged Japan and especially South Korea will be to consider building nuclear capabilities — particularly as the latter is motivated by broad public support and insufficient input into U.S. alliance defence decision making.

• U.S.-China tensions are likely to undercut the effectiveness of sanctions on North Korea let alone coordinated diplomacy that would enable negotiations, but it is also unproductive to rely on Beijing as the singular actor capable of influencing Pyongyang.

• AUKUS has had consequences on the region’s views of defence as South Korea’s inability to secure similar nuclear technology as a U.S. ally has sowed distrust whereas several ASEAN members view the pact as a destabilizing and undesirable force.

SPEAKER HIGHLIGHTS
On the challenge of North Korea:

This is no longer a nonproliferation challenge. This is a disarmament challenge. And yet we continue to use the nonproliferation approach. What this means then is that we have to convince a country that has a weaker military, a weaker nuclear weapons program; a country that is living in a nuclearized neighbourhood; a country that we’re technically still at war with; and a country whose political system is at odds with what we want; that if they disarm they will be safe and to trust us. This is a tall order, especially after the examples of Iraq, Libya, and now Ukraine. We must realize that our approach needs to change. We can no longer be held to this idea that North Korea is going to magically make this decision and that they’re going to see great value in these negotiations to disarm.

On the consequences of ineffective approaches to North Korea:

The consequence of continuing to be ineffective is that countries like South Korea and Japan will start to consider their nuclear options. This may especially be the case in the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Those anxieties are heightened now as there now has been a nuclear weapon state that has attacked a non-nuclear weapon state and threatened to use nuclear weapons.

On North Korea today:

In the 1990s, North Korea was willing to negotiate with us as they were in a weak position at the time. The country was in the midst of famine and political transition. However, North Korea in the 1990s isn’t the North Korea that exists today. While there was a window of opportunity in 2018, where North Korea saw value in trying to change the relationship and in trying to use their nuclear weapons program as a way to re-enter the international order, that sentiment and calcu-
lus seem to be gone today. As we continue to emphasize great power competition and U.S.-China rivalry, it creates options for North Korea to choose different paths.

On the difficulty of an arms control approach to North Korea:

We are not starting at a point of parity, but rather an incredible disparity between U.S. capabilities, South Korean capabilities, and North Korean capabilities. An arms control approach is not just unilateral North Korea making moves on disarmament and putting limitations on their own arms development in exchange for some kind of economic concessions, but it’s going to require the U.S., South Korea, and possibly even Japan to also make security concessions that would convince the North Koreans that this is the right choice and we’re all moving in the right direction.

On the North Korean dilemma:

We need to be realistic here and think about how can we create the kind of environment and kind of relationship that would allow North Korea to make different decisions. This process is going to be incredibly unpopular because it will have to involve moves that improve relations with North Korea over time. Simply putting a piece of paper out to say that we will guarantee your security is not going to have any credibility. We’ve seen this over and over through time. Thus, in order to get that trust it is going to take moves that start to build a more positive relationship.

If we approach this issue that North Korea always has to move first - always have to do something on the nuclear front first - we will continue to stay in a stalemate at this point in time, especially as the security situation in Asia continues to deteriorate. The questions in front of us are do we want to continue to be ineffective and live with a potential nuclear South Korea and Japan in the future? Or are we willing to try something drastically different and unpopular?

On why South Korea wants nuclear weapons:

No ally is 100% assured. And these are extraordinary times, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If you’re in Seoul and you’re looking at the external environment of the world, what you see is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the failure to uphold the Budapest memorandum which includes U.S.
security assurances, high U.S. restraints when engaging with Russia given that the Russians have nuclear weapons and little transparency to U.S. strategic planning. Even if they’re under the U.S.’ extended nuclear deterrence, they are not involved in the decision-making process.

There’s no formal mechanism, especially during conflict or wartime that guarantees the U.S. President even calls the South Korean President before making a decision. So there are a lot of questions on how the U.S. would determine whether or not to use nuclear weapons. Would they actually consult the South Koreans before making the decision, and if they can respond and make the decision fast enough given the proximity of North Korea to South Korea?

On South Korea’s strategic mindset today:

What you hear in Korean policy circles pre-Ukraine were discussions regarding finding the right balance between conventional and extended deterrence or do we need nuclear weapons. You don’t really hear the or anymore. What you hear in public sentiment is that we need both. The longer it takes to have some kind of productive or meaningful dialogue with the North Koreans, the more South Korea considers its options. We are seeing strong trends, especially from a younger generation, of people who generally see little value in the idea of U.S. nuclear weapons going back onto the Korean Peninsula. This is largely due to the fact that South Korea would have no command and control. If South Korea is going to take the risks of possessing nuclear weapons, they might as well have the command and control to use them.

**Jeffrey Lewis**

Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Project, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies

— United States

On the possibility of denuclearization in North Korea?
Is denuclearization achievable? No, it is a fantasy and it has been so for many many years. The very fact that North Korea chose the term denuclearization tells you much of what you need to know. They never use the word disarmament because by denuclearization they mean a process that applies to all parties. They believe that they built nuclear weapons because they were under nuclear threats. So unless you believe that the United States is going to engage in disarmament matched by the North Koreans, then you are not going to have a process of denuclearization.

On North Korea:

North Korea has laid out a very ambitious program for modernizing its nuclear forces and has conducted a number of missile exercises that are designed as nuclear pre-emptive strikes. Kim Jong-un has made it clear that he will never ever bargain this capability away because he believes that the U.S. poses a threat to him. They have concluded that if they are invaded, their best hope of surviving is the large-scale use of short and medium-range nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan.

On actions to be taken:

We have to understand that we have other interests at stake. And those interests are reducing the risk of a nuclear war with North Korea. That starts first and foremost with reducing tension on the peninsula and also finding a way to talk with the North Koreans regarding how they think about nuclear weapons to lower misunderstanding.

On North Korea and China:

The North Koreans don’t really like the Chinese. They don’t really like being dependent on the Chinese. And the reason that the North Koreans were willing to reach out to the U.S. on several occasions is precisely that they did not wish to be solely dependent on Beijing. With that said, the idea that China can provide some kind of magic wand that will solve all our problems is as big of a fantasy as the idea of North Korea’s disarmament. The more North Korea is, the more important those weapons are to them. To the extent that we succeed in organizing the Chinese to act contrary to North Korean interests will only underline to the North Koreans in a very hostile world that their only friend that they have is the
On reducing nuclear risk with North Korea:

There’s a set of conversations the U.S. needs to be having with North Korea. The first should be about what a more normal relationship looks like that doesn’t involve disarmament. If the U.S. were to be open to some sanctions relief and some economic assistance, we can then potentially buy things other than disarmament with our economic leverage. I would use that to better incentivize better behaviour out of the North Koreans. The second conversation that needs to be had is how North Korea thinks about nuclear weapons and under which conditions they would use nuclear weapons because we are increasingly moving into this situation where their plan is to go first. Once an invasion is inevitable, they’re going to try to use nuclear weapons first to stop the invasion before it really gets going. And the South Korean plan is trying to kill Kim Jong-un with missiles before he has the chance to do that. They both think that they’re going to go first and one of them is wrong about that. From a strategic perspective, this is a doomsday machine.

Lami Kim
Director, East Asia Studies Program, U.S. Army War College; Strategy & Statecraft Fellow, Center for Strategic & International Studies
— United States

On the costs of pursuing an arms control deal with North Korea:

This will essentially mean recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, which would undermine the United States’ global nonproliferation efforts. If North Korea can have nuclear weapons, why can’t Iran have nuclear weapons? Or Saudi Arabia or Turkey for that matter. Also, if it becomes clear that there’s no hope that North Korea will ever denuclearize, South Korea and Japan may also pursue nuclear weapons. They may also feel betrayed by the fact that the U.S. seeks to defend itself only but disregards its security concern. This undermines
On the potential for U.S.-China collaboration on denuclearization in North Korea:

Collaboration between the United States and China on denuclearization in North Korea is unlikely due to the ongoing War in Ukraine and the intensifying U.S.-China great power competition. The world is becoming bifurcated along ideological lines and then ties among authoritarian regimes like China, Russia, and North Korea are becoming more solidified. Without China’s support, sanctions against North Korea are not going to be effective.

On the effectiveness of reducing nuclear risk with North Korea:

If you only consider the United States and North Korea, it would make sense to have some sort of sanctions relief in exchange for something like a freezing of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. In this case, North Korea would not secure the ability to launch a nuclear attack against the U.S. mainland. And theoretically, this would also make Japan and South Korea more confident about the United States’ extended deterrence. However, Japan and South Korea are unlikely to really feel that way. They will feel very insecure as long as they realize that the U.S. is not going to do anything about really eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons. If you think about all stakeholders, such a deal is unrealistic.

On different reactions to AUKUS:

For the South Koreans, the AUKUS deal was shocking because the U.S. and the UK were willing to transfer nuclear power supply technology to Australia while the U.S. doesn’t allow South Korea to use its own capability to build nuclear power submarines.

From the United States’ perspective, transferring nuclear technology to Australia doesn’t really pose a great proliferation threat because Australia doesn’t have any nuclear capabilities. The country doesn’t have a civil nuclear program so they don’t have the ability to convert nuclear fission materials to nuclear weapons.

The responses from India and ASEAN countries have been mixed. India, who seeks to counter China both on land and at sea, sees the agreement as one that lessens India’s security burden, thus providing it with more breathing room. How-
ever, some find the deal very provocative and worry that the deal will destabilize the Western Pacific, which will have negative consequences for the Indian Ocean as well.

ASEAN countries are also divided on this issue. While Singapore and the Philippines support the deal as balancing against China. Some pro-Chinese countries such as Cambodia and Laos do not welcome it. Indonesia and Malaysia have expressed their concerns that the deal would trigger an arms race in the region and destabilize the region. In general, ASEAN as an organization is wary of foreign countries exerting influence in the region. This deal may contradict or erode the so-called ASEAN centrality which maintains the need for ASEAN to be at the center and play the primary role of promoting security in the region.

Andrew Latham
Nonresident Fellow, Defense Priorities; Professor, Macalester College
— Canada / United States

On dynamics on the Korean Peninsula:

States are always motivated by honour, fear, and interests. Honour is the pursuit of status and prestige. Fear is insecurity. And interests boil down to the pursuit of power. We can see these aspects in various ways and varying degrees on display on both sides of the inner Korean border.

On the northern side, we do see insecurity. There’s also the pursuit of status and prestige. When you have an international system where the big boys get to have nuclear weapons and everybody else only gets to be second-class citizens - like nuclear apartheid - some states will be motivated to join the club. When it comes to power, there are no illusions when it comes to Kim Jong-un. It’s all about power. On the southern side, it’s about fear. It’s about fear of what the North Korean rogue state would do.
When looking at those dynamics on both sides of the border, one would find mounting pressure for nuclear proliferation. On the Northern side, you find vertical proliferation. It seems like they’re looking to increase the size of their arsenal and perhaps improve the quality of their warheads and delivery systems. This can be very destabilizing. And then the horizontal proliferation is equally frightening. Recent opinion polls in South Korea indicate that, for the first time ever, the South Korean people are really beginning to think seriously and look favourably upon the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons capability.

On both sides of the border, I see nothing that is pushing either government in the direction of either not going nuclear or disarming. I don’t think any amount of confidence and security building is actually going to reduce the insecurity the regime found in North Korea. I don’t see what could be done that they would take seriously other than the U.S. unilaterally disarming, which isn’t in the cards. There is not much scope for disarmament in the North and nonproliferation in the South.

On what role Canada can play in reducing nuclear proliferation:

The only avenue that’s open to Canada to influence this dynamic is to do what Canada has almost always done: Which is, in whatever forum and in whatever way, to reinforce that nuclear taboo.
About Us

The Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD) is a non-profit and non-partisan North American international affairs think tank operating in the United States and Canada dedicated to promoting dialogue, diplomacy, prudent realism, and military restraint—principles which we believe are the four cornerstones of sustainable peace in an increasingly complex and dynamic international system.

Visit us at peacediplomacy.org to learn more.

© 2023 Institute for Peace & Diplomacy

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada is a not-for-profit organization focused on Canada's relations with Asia. Our mission is to be Canada's catalyst for engagement with Asia and Asia's bridge to Canada.

Visit us at asiapacific.ca to learn more.

© 2023 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada